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Concept for Validating the Theoretical Potential of 
Historical Sources. 
The Case of Analyzing Long-Term Changes in the 
Habsburg Military Habitus 
Helmut Kuzmics ∗ 
Abstract: »Ein Konzept zur Validierung des theoretischen Potentials histori-
scher Quellen. Am Beispiel der Analyse langfristiger Wandlungen des habs-
burgischen Militärhabitus«. Interpreting sources that stretch over a period of 
more than a century causes major methodological problems. For every type of 
source, different pragmatic contexts exist on the level of the generation of 
these data (administrative, audience-directed etc.) that determine also the pos-
sible uses for descriptive and explanatory purposes. The paper argues that al-
though these problems should not be neglected it is, nevertheless, possible to 
overcome them in a reflexive, theoretically informed way. The example dis-
cussed here is how to verify the assumption of a stable habitus: Most Habsburg 
commanders and officers seemed to have lacked the readiness to take (calcu-
lated) risks and initiative – the qualities of good leadership. Can we explain 
lacking success in war by a specific Austrian military habitus? This paper tries 
to solve this puzzle by analyzing selected autobiographies, official files, liter-
ary sources and semi-official regimental histories that contain descriptions and 
declamations of the relevant emotions that steered the behaviour of Austrian 
officers and commanders throughout this period of more than a century. 
Keywords: Theory and Methods, Figurational Sociology, Sociology of Emo-
tions, Military Sociology, Habitus, Validity, Military Personnel Records, Ego-
Documents, Autobiographies 
1. The Research Problem: 
Grasping an Austrian Military Habitus and Identifying its 
Role in Success or Failure in War 
The Habsburg officer has left his traces in hundreds of reels of film that trans-
mit to us a brilliantly deceptive picture of his nature or better: of his appear-
ance. He is charming, wears a sparkling uniform, is a darling both to mature 
ladies and betrayed, innocent girls; he is most often not too clever, but never 
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shuns a duel and takes the field courageously, particularly when reserved for 
merry military exercises. If we want to deal with his (and his commander’s) 
fate in the spirit of objective science, though, this picture most certainly has to 
be redrawn and revised. It is also necessary to specify these emotions according 
to the main goals of a research-agenda, which is defined by one interest: how to 
explain success or failure in war as being caused by a certain type of collective 
mentality, in this case, of Habsburg armies throughout a period of more than a 
century until the final collapse of the Dual Monarchy in the year 1918. We start 
with the astonishing stability of certain constellations in the Austrian history of 
armed conflict: After the overwhelming victories of Prince Eugene against 
Turks and French between 1683 and 1736, no decisive and lasting triumph was 
secured by Habsburg armies. 
In the character of Austrian officers and commanders, we encounter the 
paradox of an unbroken, feudal and chivalrous warrior-spirit (Allmayer-Beck 
1987: 31-2) that is in marked contrast to an attitude of faltering and wavering, 
of dependency and indecision, which makes defeat seem inevitable. This holds 
true for most of the second half of the 18th century, but it culminates in the 
French Wars from 1792 to 1815. Around the year 1800, Napoleon’s way of 
making war was, simple, quick and ruthless, compared to Austria’s. Even the 
great reformer of the Austrian army, Archduke Charles, victor in the battle of 
Aspern, was not prepared to accept this new line of thinking unconditionally 
(Krieg 1809. Vol. I 1907: 116). His officers and generals were even less able to 
adapt to it, according to the opinion expressed in the so-called ‘Generalstab-
swerk’ about the Napoleonic War in 1809, roughly a hundred years after the 
event: 
Individual capable leaders, as they might have proved to be while conducting 
small detachments and performing duties that formed part of the so-called 
‘small war’, lost any initiative, did nothing without obtaining orders from a-
bove, as soon as they felt themselves caught in the narrow framework of the 
army. They saw themselves, according to tradition, only as a little cog of the 
big machine, whose movement, small or big, depended only on the main dri-
ving force, the supreme command. This behavior of leaders of the lower ranks 
left its imprint of passive obedience on the Austrian army, an obedience, 
which made the troops sacrifice themselves in blind devotion but which sel-
dom encouraged them to act in a self-reliant and circumspect way. This led 
necessarily to massive failure against an enemy who showed activity and ini-
tiative on the grandest possible scale (Krieg 1809. Vol. I 1907: 118; translati-
on by author). 
The late-baroque ‘Austrian philosophy of battle’ (Allmayer-Beck/Lessing 
1981) with its tendency towards paralyzing inactivity had already been put to 
painful test by the Prussian Frederick II; Napoleon enforced a total reversal. 
But in spite of all reformist activity (with reforms also after defeat in the battles 
at Solferino and Königgrätz), Rauchensteiner was to characterize the quality of 
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Austrian command in Word War I in roughly the same words. Here after the 
failed autumn campaign of Luck 1915, he writes: 
What could be seen here, was a dilemma of Austro-Hungarian command, 
though, and in particular, it was also a dilemma of its commanders. The com-
manders of the army and a whole lot of commanders of army corps were, in-
deed, neither able to show initiative nor to guide a practical operation inde-
pendently. They showed a degree of dilettantism that was shamefully 
concealed by most of Austrian literature written after the war.  
But it would probably not be correct to single out individual persons and to 
criticize them. Since they were not single individuals! From the army’s 
supreme command, to the army commanders, and the commanders of army 
corps and of divisions, one had to conclude time and again that the generals 
fell mostly short of expectations, developed too little initiative, did not always 
obey to orders and, above all, could neither convince nor inspire. Therefore, to 
talk of failure is not enough, for the reasons for it were to some extent, indeed, 
more profound than that (Rauchensteiner 1994: 290; translation by author). 
Rauchensteiner blames the training. But it was just this education and train-
ing that had continually been addressed since the war against Prussia in the 
18th century. Did the Habsburg armies never succeed in adapting to the stan-
dards of their time, in spite of eternal reforming? 
Beyond its possible interest to military historians, this question can also be 
formulated as a more general one, in a broader historical-sociological context. 
Why do some states assert themselves in the course of history, and why do 
others fail? This question has re-emerged in Sociology, after a period of rather 
abstract and economically oriented thinking in terms of prospects and trends of 
‘modernization’ with all its implicit vagueness. 
A re-born historical sociology (Abrams 1982; Smith 1991; Mann 1993; 
Tilly 1992) has renewed our interest in the problems of state formation and 
warlike state competition as well. But not accidentally, probably, our focus of 
attention had also been directed to psycho-history as a historical sociology of 
emotions. Both have brilliantly come together in Elias’s theory of the civilizing 
process (Elias 2000 [1939]). 
The 1980s brought a re-discovery of the nation-state and its success in over-
coming older political systems like dynastic states and empires, although most 
authors were guided by their wishes to see an end both to nations and national-
ism (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). 
For Anderson (1974), Austria’s major defect lay in her inability to bring 
about fully developed capitalism, embodying, at the same time, a dissociating 
negation of the bourgeois nation-state. Roughly the same complex of argu-
ments can be found in Kennedy’s (1990) account of overstretched great powers 
with limited economic resources: According to Kennedy, Austria’s fall out of 
the ranks of the established great powers was simply due to lack of resources 
and national cohesion, although Kennedy does agree with the revisionist line of 
thinking that refuses to see the Habsburg economy as a failure, in line with 
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Good (1984). This view of over-stretch is shared by a recent historical analysis 
for the 18th century in a detailed way (Hochedlinger 2003). M. Mann’s (1993) 
certainly most sophisticated account discusses all these factors, putting weight 
rather on the lack of common citizenship and the dynastic madness of pursuing 
ambitious aims in geopolitical state-competition that lacked realism, exacer-
bated by a profound lack of leadership and wisdom. 
But what these three historical-sociological narratives omit is any mention 
of mentalities or social (or national) habitus. None of the authors discussed the 
emotional aspect of this process of knock-out competition between empires and 
nation-states. They converge in attributing a major role to military success or 
failure – losing decisive battles or winning them –, but they do not provide any 
information of how these were achieved or experienced. These explanations 
cannot, for instance, tell why it was so often the case that Habsburg armies lost 
battles even when they were hugely superior in numbers. 
Austria’s status as a great power was a result of the victory over the Otto-
man Empire at the turn of the 18th century. After the triumphs under the lead-
ership of Prince Eugene, virtually no decisive victories were achieved until the 
fateful year of 1914. The slow decline of Austrian greatness, however, lasted 
two centuries and it contained ample opportunities for successes on the battle-
field. In the wars against Prussia (1740-1763), France (1792-1815), Prussia 
again (1866) and the Entente-powers (1914-1918), Austrian armies – contra-
dicting the myth of total financial neglect and poor equipment – enjoyed, time 
and again, the advantage of substantial numerical superiority over their oppo-
nents, at least in some decisive battles. 
Why did they also often end in defeat? To select just a few examples, Habs-
burg armies lost battles against numerically weaker enemies at Soor 1745 
(Österreichischer Erbfolgekrieg 1740-1748. Vol. VII. 1896: 577-9) and 
Leuthen 1757 (Allmayer-Beck/Lessing 1981: 47, 92), Ulm 1805 and Eggmühl 
1809 (Schmitthenner 1937), Königgrätz 1866 (Preil 1993) and Luck 1915 
(Rauchensteiner 1994). 
Some elements seem to be common to all these defeats – slowness of 
movement, lack of energy, indecisiveness, scattering of forces, passivity, but 
not seldom combined with enormous sacrifices in reckless, suicidal attacks. 
This doesn’t mean that we have to believe in an outmoded concept of ‘deci-
sive battles’ as turning points of world history. As Clausewitz had already 
pointed out, it is very often the numerically weaker who, if only determined 
enough, wins the day. In addition, the ability to form successful coalitions is 
very often more important for achieving survival or triumph in state-
competition – a very good example is Austria herself in the Napoleonic wars: it 
was only by forming a successful coalition – and not by spectacular fighting – 
that she survived these disastrous years as a formidable great power. 
And, last but not least, the situational and institutional constraints that can 
be summarized as consequences of ‘over-stretch’ might remain the central 
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causal factor but with the addition that they operate by way of a mediating 
mentality or habitus. In this case, it will act not as an independent but as a 
dependent ‘variable’, gaining independent causal value only if seen as a habitus 
lagging behind otherwise changed social conditions (of armament, strategy or 
geopolitical constellations). 
But if it is correct that a certain mentality was responsible for defeat in state-
competition: how, then, can we prove it sociologically? I think that a sociol-
ogy-of-emotions perspective might help a lot here. 
2. Problems in Operationalizing the Concept of a Military 
Habitus 
The concept of a ‘social habitus’ has always been a very difficult one, and its 
sociological use presupposes careful elaboration of it in terms of definition, 
range (officers vs. common soldiers), consequences for the selection of data 
and its place in causal explanation. 
2.1 Defining Concepts 
The basic problem of an historical explanation based on the assumption of a 
collective mentality (as an approximation of the concept of ‘habitus’) is simply 
to overcome the disbelief of all those who deeply mistrust the possibility of 
gaining reliable, intersubjective access to a person’s inner world of feelings and 
perceptions. Since the core of history as a discipline is still defined by the 
chronological reconstruction of events as reported by spotless sources, and 
since neither the grand nor the petty emotions would normally find their way 
into those, historians are notably sceptical and will probably always be so. 
While they did not necessarily need to subscribe to Berkeley’s solipsism (Lo-
renz 1997: 113), they would – and still do – always prefer data that either al-
lows for an easy classification of observable objects or that provides unequivo-
cal evidence of clear intentions (therefore, the focus is on ‘intentional 
explanations’ and the accordance of – rational – plans with subsequent action 
(Lorenz 1997: 115-6). 
Therefore, it took many generations of historians before the power of the 
‘unconscious’ or the ‘Super-ego’ (Freud) was acknowledged, at which point a 
new psycho-history (P.Ariès, L. De Mause, P.Gay, R. Porter etc.) arrived and 
claimed its rank among the established disciplines. The second blow to ‘inten-
tional’ explanations was the existence of all non-intentional consequences of 
planned action, and the more so, if they formed a kind of ‘structure’ with a 
certain order. Both – the unconscious and the non-intentional – are combined in 
Elias’s theory of civilizing processes (Elias 2000). But this is sociology. 
Although, sociology, too, harbours representatives of various schools who 
are against too much theorising about ‘inner states’ of feeling – like some sym-
 275
bolic interactionists (Blumer 1973) or followers of the model of ‘rational 
choice’ –, it has developed manifold methods of qualitative research that can 
cope with emotions quite well. Here, the skepticism revolves around the notion 
of a process spanning several generations and generating a recognizably stable 
structure of ‘social’ or ‘national’ habitus; in particular, a new orthodoxy has 
formed itself that treats everything ethnic or national as ‘constructed’ or ‘in-
vented’ (Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983; Anderson 1983). 
Therefore, the concept of a state-specific military habitus needs careful 
elaboration in order to allow empirical data to function as ‘plausible evidence’ 
for an interpretive, ‘verstehende’ sociological method (see Schwandt 1998: 
225-235 for the difference between phenomenological and interactionist con-
ceptions of ‘Verstehen’, and Kincheloe/McLaren 1998: 287-8 for the criterion 
of ‘trustworthiness’ against conventional ‘validity’). 
In order to give an unequivocal empirical meaning to the concept of a mili-
tary habitus that shaped the behaviour of Austrian commanders and officers, it 
will have to developed in five steps: 
1) I discuss some of the emotions occurring most often in soldiers, officers and 
commanders at war. 
2) I will turn to the concept of habitus as used by Elias. 
3) I embrace the still relevant analytical distinctions made by Clausewitz 
(1952). 
4) I turn to some attempts of operationalization in a well-known study of empi-
rical research (‘The American Soldier’, Stouffer et al. 1949) 
5) I will discuss the implications for the collection of historical data. 
Against the conventional view of ‘battle’ as social event that military histo-
rians have developed, John Keegan (1976/1991) has put particular emphasis on 
the concrete experience of the single ill-treated soldier himself. There is no neat 
and well-ordered picture for him. Physically and psychologically, things are in 
constant flux; there may be hours of secure boredom and passivity, and then 
suddenly, he is thrown into a tumultuous sequence of extremely dangerous 
moments. He can experience exultation, panic, rage, grief, consternation, cour-
age, and feelings of loyalty to his comrades in arms. In principle, he will live 
through every affect that we might find in one of the current lists (Tomkins 
1963): joy, fear, anger, shame, disgust or dismay, grief, surprise and distress, 
although quite likely in differing composition and proportions according to the 
difference between peaceful everyday-life and organized fight. We may distin-
guish three aspects of these emotions: 
- somatic (acceleration of the heart-beat, sweating, trembling etc.); 
- behavioural (flight or attack, including the expressive aspect, functional in 
group communication) and the 
- feeling-component (i.e., panic) in the narrower sense of the term ‘emotion’ 
(Elias 1987). 
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All these emotions are subject to what Elias called ‘affect control’, enforced 
by external constraints or self-constraint, although in varying degree, from 
extreme panic to moderate, ‘civilized’ anxieties, which are accessible to cogni-
tive planning. 
Those emotions and emotional controls which can be seen as relevant for 
the success in battle (‘courage’, ‘boldness’, ‘discipline’) are, of course, also 
subject to social change; the ‘lust for attack’ of a medieval knight may turn into 
irresponsible rashness under the condition of narrow tactical discipline in the 
machine-like armies centuries later; ‘heroism’ might appear in the disguise of 
dignified perseverance under heavy fire. ‘Boldness’ is different in the case of a 
common infantryman or a general (Keegan 1987/1997): the latter’s boldness 
can take the form of considered restraint. 
The expression of emotions can be genuine or feigned; much of what counts 
as qualities of good leadership involves the emotional labour of simulating 
feelings (appearing untouched, calm, or fiery). 
And finally, we have to distinguish between emotions as a result of situ-
ational constraints and as a result of relatively stable dispositions, of ‘personal-
ity’ and its ‘traits’ (Argyle 1976). The latter contain elements of learned behav-
iour – the so-called ‘social’ or ‘national habitus’ (Elias 1996) in case of stable 
institutional arrangements, of social mints that coin ‘civilized’ behaviour. 
2.2 Officers vs. General Soldiers 
Everywhere in the world, a good general gives his orders in unmistakable 
terms, is outspoken and clear, and an excellent observer. He also cares for his 
men, gives praise to them if necessary and sees to it that they are well-
nourished and -paid. But, in order to motivate the troops, he must also control 
the expression of his own emotions which may involve not only self-mastery 
but also a good portion of play-acting. The commander’s emotions and emo-
tional control are, therefore, no less important than those of the common sol-
dier. They are certainly of no lesser importance to success in battle than the 
situational and technological factors that limit ‘command in war’ as has been 
shown by Van Creveld (1987). 
In a sociological perspective, what counts is the unity of a process-related 
sociological puzzle – here, like in Elias’s famous examples, I develop a domi-
nant research question (the apparently hapless behaviour of Austrian armies in 
the 19th and early 20th centuries), and I try to solve it with the help of the 
concept of ‘habitus’. By ‘habitus’ – a word which he used long before its popu-
larization by Pierre Bourdieu – Elias basically means ‘second nature’ or ‘em-
bodied social learning’’ (Dunning/Mennell 1996: IX). A habitus, as Elias once 
remarked, usually takes at least three generations to appear (and, probably, 
three to disappear). A habitus is the result of learned affective controls – of 
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fears and joys and their consideration in action-chains of varying length and 
varying degrees of rational planning. 
2.3 Choosing and Finding Appropriate Data 
The general notion both of emotions in war and of an affect-regulating military 
habitus was already familiar to Clausewitz. For Clausewitz (1952: 255), no 
normative theory of war could be formulated without giving these ‘immaterial’ 
forces their due: 
Since no victory, for instance, can be plausibly explained in its effects without 
taking the moral impressions into consideration. And, thus, most of the sub-
jects we deal with in this book consist of half physical, half moral causes and 
effects, and one would like to say: the physical forces appear rather only like 
the wooden shaft of a sword while the moral ones are the precious metal, the 
real, ground-down weapon (Clausewitz 1952: 255; translation by author). 
For Clausewitz, these factors were inseparably linked and could be distin-
guished only analytically. Most remarkable was his concept of ‘martial virtues 
of the troops’ (‘kriegerische Tugend eines Heeres’). These properties should 
not be equated simply with courage and enthusiasm for war, both of which are 
seen as necessary, but not sufficient conditions for these martial virtues to 
emerge. Practice and training have to follow, as do obedience, rule and method. 
War is a business that can turn into a craft exercised with ease and reliability. 
The control of emotions is central to it – not getting terrified by imagined fears, 
but fighting against justified ones; showing pride in victory, but not despairing 
and disobeying in defeat; keeping trust and confidence in their leaders even in 
misery – such is an army that is infused with a warlike spirit. If we conceptual-
ize ‘habitus’ in a way that it contains both emotional and cognitive elements as 
well as behavioural automatisms that become ‘second nature’, already visible 
in the make-up of the person (soldier, officer, commander), then this is the 
concept Clausewitz had in mind. ‘Kriegerische Tugend’ is a product of critical 
experiences in battles (‘battle-hardened’ is the term we need) and of successful 
commanders; it emerges during wars but can persist through several genera-
tions, even in periods of peace. Its main elements are boldness and persever-
ance. The development of the ‘joy of attacking’ (Elias 2000: 161-71) through-
out the civilizing process, conceived as a process of weakening of emotions 
like anger or rage, from altruistic sentiments of friendship to the pleasure of 
physical combat, can go into two ideal-typical directions: 
1) optimization and routinization of constraints by others, i.e. discipline, defi-
ned as the automation of self-constraints, 
2) strengthening of self-constraints in terms of individual self-control. 
Following this latter criterion, the war of commanders and officers is always 
more civilized than the war of common soldiers; but we may also think of 
developments that lead to more self-reliance and autonomy of the ordinary 
soldier himself. The main subject of the well-known study on the ‘American 
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Soldier’ (Stouffer et al. 1949) was, thus, to explore what would ‘make the 
[soldiers] want to keep going and do as well as [they] could’ after they had 
already had combat experience. 
Some hints can be found in the percentage of people who say that they were 
motivated by ‘solidarity with the group’ or ‘thoughts of home and loved ones’, 
but which emotions are hidden behind the business-like formulation ‘ending 
the task’ (39%, and therefore the largest part of the respondents, consented to 
this sentence)? Some confessed to ‘vindictiveness’, and largely their officers 
believed that many men were motivated by ‘leadership and discipline’ (19%; as 
opposed to only 1% of the men, who agreed to that). We do not find any item 
in this study which could be interpreted simply in terms of what Elias called 
‘Angriffslust’ (best translated as ‘attacking spirit’ or ‘joy of attacking’): The 
closest results we can get are the 59% of respondents who believe that ‘the best 
combat soldier [they] have known’ showed, above all, courage and aggressive-
ness (Stouffer et al. 1949: 133-4). These latter qualities were much less impor-
tant in officers (30%); whereas ‘leadership’ (56% for officers) received exactly 
the attention one would expect. We do not learn here what it is that defines 
good leadership in a more detailed way. 
Courage means the overcoming of fear, caused by the horror of war and its 
brutality. We owe John Keegan a detailed, precise description of the decisive, 
headless flight of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard in the battle of Waterloo in 1815. 
This was the famous, battle-hardened Imperial Guard, not a bunch of recently 
drafted conscripts. Why did their morale collapse? Many explanations can be 
rejected. The general and officers led their men bravely. The soldiers were 
experienced. The guard’s battle-order was immaculate, in spite of massive gun-
fire before the attack. Paradoxically, the flight did not begin where the danger 
was greatest and the enemy-fire most painful – here, the guard did not give in. 
The flight-movement occurred in the rear where, apparently, the danger was 
less; but, according to Keegan, the attacking column had been very narrow, 
organized in depth, and so the effect of forced passivity (the soldiers had no 
space to put up a fierce resistance) added to the lack of knowledge about what 
was going on at the front. Unguided, they were hit by an irresistible wave of 
panic, and an absolute elite-formation dissolved into a sheer crowd. In such 
cases, neither fear of sanctions nor the loss of ‘honour’, of respect in the eyes 
of the others can help, although, normally, group-pressure and the fear of 
shame are the most important pillars to secure ‘discipline’ and ‘courage’. 
How dramatically fear can be experienced has also been demonstrated in 
‘The American Soldier (Stouffer et al. 1949: 201): In one of the most telling of 
all survey-research items ever (Fear Symptoms Reported by Troops in Combat 
Divisions), the Division A-soldiers from the Pacific war-theatre confessed that 
they had experienced somatic symptoms at least sometimes: from ‘violent 
pounding of the heart’ (84%) to ‘vomiting’ (27%), ‘losing control of bowels’ 
(21%) and ‘urinating in pants’ (10%). 65% of the soldiers (Stouffer et al. 1949: 
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232) admitted to having experienced a state of fear at least once that had made 
them virtually unable to react ‘adequately’ in battle (this is an important finding 
and has to be weighed against the manifold criticisms against quantification as 
reported in Schweber 2002). 
A good example for this is given by the Italian writer and soldier in the First 
World War, Emilio Lussu, who described the emotions in the fight after ‘going 
over the top’ without shelter and under heavy fire: Instead of using his pistol, 
he throws a stick, an ‘alpenstock’ on the bewildered Austrians, who catch it in 
the air (Lussu 1992: 128). 
If we think that male pride seldom allows for confessions like these as made 
by Lussu and the American soldiers in the study, we gain both an idea of how 
often these emotions will be under-reported (also in fiction!) and of what 
‘courage’ or ‘boldness’ really mean (as conscious, reflexive action or automati-
cally trained behaviour in face of terrible fright). We can also take it for certain 
that their meanings will vary in time. 
Let us now summarize the methodological implications for the study of the 
Austrian habitus of ‘tarrying and faltering’ from 1800 to 1918. Explaining 
behaviour as a consequence of a certain ‘habitus’ means that we are able to 
typify some character traits which restrict the free choices of acting and favour 
some alternatives above others. The best possible data are those which allow us 
simultaneously to identify the emotion and the corresponding behaviour, that 
can be seen as the result (for instance, panic and a silly decision to withdraw in 
face of overestimated danger). Such data will be rare, since this would mean 
having an observer (or honest self-reporter) being present where both the emo-
tion occurs and the action takes place. Moreover, also the behaviour is rare, 
since it occurs in a few battles that interrupt usually far longer periods of peace. 
And a habitus can not be observed directly, but only indirectly, by selecting 
indicators that allow to draw plausible conclusions. 
2.4 Building an Historical Causal Explanation 
Moreover, emotions can evade both the observer and the consciousness of the 
actors themselves: in the case of by-passed, unacknowledged shame, Scheff 
and Retzinger (1991) have demonstrated the absence of all normally reliable 
‘markers’ of shame, such as trembling hands, gestures of flight, and blushing, 
whereas only accelerated speed of speech, combined with the tacit knowledge 
of its cause, may indicate a state of deep shame. And it may be taken for 
granted that such shame-states are not even noticed by the person involved 
himself. We might need a lot of additional, biographical information in order 
to be able to decide questions like these; this information might only be found 
in autobiographies or detailed biographies which, in the absence of videotaped 
interactions, can usually only be found for persons of a certain, usually higher, 
social status. 
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But putting these problems aside, emotions can also be detected often quite 
easily – in everyday-life as well as in the particular situation of scientific obser-
vation: We might look for nonverbal and verbal indicators of emotional states 
(gestures, sounds, mimics, whole-body posture etc.; speech acts of all kind). 
Because emotions also have a behavioural component (e. g. the fight-or-flight-
reaction; Elias 1987), people are able to interpret this behaviour as indicating 
the emotion quite reliably – otherwise, social life would not be possible at all. 
Proceeding from emotions to a habitus characterised by a particular mixture 
of affects and learned affective controls, we might also gain information about 
the social environments that shape it. 
The stable traits of a type of personality may be the result of early socializa-
tion (thus generating what Clausewitz called the ‘martial spirit of the people’ 
[‘kriegerischen Volksgeist’]; in the Habsburg monarchy, Tyroleans or the Serbs 
and Croats of the so-called ‘military border’ against the Ottoman Empire 
[‘Militärgrenze’] might be plausible candidates). But more often, as also 
Clausewitz maintains, the ‘martial virtues’ of an army are the result of a certain 
continuity of institutions and their ‘ésprit de corps’. Here, the stability of char-
acter very often might mean the stability of situations that vary only little from 
generation to generation. Austria might never have achieved the highest possi-
ble degree of professionalization throughout the century – what we would need 
here, therefore, is information about the institutions of training and military 
education. They are inseparably linked to the fate of the whole, dynastic state 
itself and we would certainly need some process-related information about it – 
a biography of ‘Austria’ (or ‘Austria-Hungary’) from the Napoleonic Wars to 
its demise as a political unit in the year 1918. 
Provided we can obtain the data as sketched here so far, this will still not be 
sufficient for the causal explanation that we aim at (that it is a habitus which 
co-determines success or failure in war). In order to be able to estimate its 
effect, we have to collect comparative data or provide a theoretical frame 
which allows us to draw comparisons. This is probably the most difficult part 
of our enterprise: It is not enough to show that Austrian officers had problems 
in taking bold and circumspect decisions – we must be able to infer that their 
problems were greater than those of the French, the Prussians or the Russians, 
in any case, than those of the immediate rival in state-competition. We can only 
hope to occasionally get such direct information (e. g. French visitors uttering 
harsh opinions about the Austrian or voices of Austrians, comparing their situa-
tion unfavourably to that of the Prussians). 
For the purpose of this paper, three types of process-generated data have 
been triangulated: 
1) public administrational data, collected for the purpose of evaluation of the 
professional qualities of Habsburg officers 
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2) an autobiographical account of an Austrian commander of the Napoleonic 
Wars (Mack, who was defeated at Ulm 1805 and tried to defend himself a-
gainst the accusation of high treason); 
3) the equally autobiographical account, based on diaries, of an Austrian gene-
ral in the First World War, compared with semi-official accounts by officers 
in a kind of ‘regimental history’. 
2.5 Paradigm Guiding Data Analysis and Interpretation 
These data will be interpreted in a middle way, somewhere between what Clif-
ford Geertz (1973) called ‘Thick Description’ and the interpretative method 
advocated by Anselm Strauss, which has become famous as ‘Grounded The-
ory’ (Strauss/Corbin 1990/1996). The latter method was developed for the 
analysis of material, gained for the explicit purpose of scientific investigation, 
be it observation, field work or qualitative interviews. The material used here 
was originally gained for other purposes: the context of data-generation differs 
from the context of scientific use. We have, therefore, to adapt a sociology-of-
knowledge perspective for the interpretation of the data in use. They are part of 
a larger process of communication in which the descriptive element of mapping 
a certain area of reality is complemented and shaped by the pragmatic functions 
of these data (evaluation reports aim at improving the quality of military staff, 
the elaborate defence of a general aims at securing the restoration of his honour 
with the help of a public audience, autobiographies may help to secure the love 
and devotion of the children and imagined grand-children; novels want to ac-
cuse or to move, and so on). 
3. Validation of Data Analysis 
Peter Laslett once wrote an essay on the relationship between the use of quali-
tative data (in particular, fictional literature) and science under the title: ‘The 
wrong way through the telescope’. Written against tendencies in his field, such 
as tendency in French histories of childhood, dying, sexuality etc., to employ 
‘soft’ methods such as the interpretation of literary sources, Laslett’s article 
pleads for a return to the virtues of the hard data of demography, such as fre-
quencies of birth and deaths, family size, age of marriage and so on. His main 
proposition is contained in the title: Those who use literary, ‘soft’ data resem-
ble the spectator who wants to see nature but stares into the diminished eye of 
another spectator instead. Reading Shakespeare to gain information on the past, 
we arrive at Shakespeare’s eye, at that which Shakespeare wants us to see of 
reality or what he allows us to see. Following Laslett, we need to find a posi-
tive answer to these questions: 
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- Since literary evidence also has non-descriptive functions (to entertain, to 
accuse, etc.), does it not distort reality by putting emphasis on these inter-
ests? 
- Could the author not have invented what he/she describes? 
- Can literary evidence be confirmed by further, perhaps nonfictional eviden-
ce? 
- Could the author have been in a position to know the social phenomena 
from first-hand experience? 
- Fiction normally contains only vague, if any, statements of frequency (of 
events, properties, etc.). Are the proportions roughly accurate reflections of 
reality? 
- A sociology of literary expression is needed which deals with the problem: 
What kind of audience was addressed by what kind of message? Since e-
xaggeration, colourization, suppression and invention are common elements 
of literature (poetic truth is different from plain truth), the social scientist 
must have a theory of that or at least a suspicion about the intentions of the 
author and their effects on the subject; how his/her position is related to the 
interests, attitudes and expectations shared by members of those strata in 
which he supposes his/her reader to be. Not only are the conscious intenti-
ons of the writer important but so, too, are the many unconscious traits of 
the socially shaped person of the literary author. 
 
Laslett’s essay aimed, primarily, at the use of literary sources, like fiction, 
poetry or drama, but many of his postulates can be extended to the use of quali-
tative data of all other kinds – such as the evaluation files, autobiographies and 
regimental histories that were the basis of the comparison drawn here. 
We can identify five aspects or dimensions of evaluation: 
1) that of the pragmatic intention, in which this act of communication took 
place, and the effect which this intention has on the correctness of self-
characterisations and of the perception of the behaviour of others, including 
external, institutional constraints; 
2) that of the value which can be attributed to the author’s utterances from the 
emic perspective (Pike 1954/1967) of his/her everyday-life view of the 
world, in the dialectics of ‘Selbstverstehen’ and ‘Fremdverstehen’ according 
to Schütz (1932/1974); these authors can be considered as lay actors who 
want to make sense of the social world as it is assumed by sociologists in the 
traditions of ethnomethodology. 
3) that of the meaning of the new source’s evidence, seen and judged from the 
etic perspective from the professional scientist him/herself who adds theo-
ries, historical and institutional knowledge; here, for instance, about the pro-
cess of Austrian state-formation and the development of the army from the 
late 18th to the early 20th century. Complementing the macro-perspective, 
we also need theoretical models of the affective make-up of the typical per-
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sonality-structure (for instance, Elias (1996) describes the warrior-mentality 
of the German aristocracy); 
4) triangulation: that of the innovative, falsifying or confirming, character of 
the new information: how typical is it for theoretical classification? 
5) conceptual generalization: the value of the information for comparative 
purposes and for judging the relative impact and extent of an Austrian habi-
tus. 
4. Data Type 1: Public Administrational Data 
4.1 Description of the Data Source 
Since the third and last war against Prussia waged for the possession of Silesia 
1756-1763, the Austrian army had introduced so-called ‘Conduite-Listen’, later 
called ‘Qualifikationslisten’ (evaluation records) in order to collect systematic 
information about the qualities Habsburg officers should possess. In doing this, 
the Austrians followed the example of the (successful) Prussians; the personal-
ity-traits of generals and commanders were included in so-called ‘individual 
descriptions’ (‘Individuelle Beschreibungen’) which were, as a rule, more 
complex than those of the officers. These records, kept by their respective 
superiors, contain a wealth of information on the average Austrian officer and 
commander, classified in those categories that were deemed important for their 
behaviour in battle and peace (in the barracks). These documents date back to 
the reign of Maria-Theresa and are available for all officers starting in the year 
1823.1 The records were kept until 1918 and can serve as a preliminary opera-
tional definition of an ‘officer-habitus’. 
Let us take a closer look at some files of officers. In the year 1838 the record 
of Joseph Radanovich – who was a long-serving captain of riflemen (‘Grena-
dier’)2 – contained the category: ‘performance’ (‘Aufführung’), with the sub-
category: behaviour (‘Betragen’), in turn with the subcategory ‘in the face of 
the enemy’ (‘vor dem Feinde’) and here, we find the entry: ‘Shows courage and 
endurance, has resolution and ambition, fulfils his duty, has been wounded 
once.’ 
Another category listed the number and year of the campaigns he was in-
volved in (‘was für Campagnen mitgemacht’): Here, we find the Napoleonic 
wars (1805, 1809, 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815), and the war in 1821. In the record 
of a 1st Lieutenant Friedrich Count Deym (for the year 1828), these categories 
are empty (‘has not served yet’, ‘none’). The evaluation file for Mathias Koller 
                                                             
1  Earlier files were largely burned in the fire that laid waste to the Austrian ‘Palace of Justice’ 
(‘Justizpalast’) in the year 1927; from 1869 onwards, they were called ‘evaluation records’ 
(‘Qualifikationslisten’; Ganser 2001). 
2  Here and in all other examples of evaluation-files the translations are my own. 
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(from the year 1824) contains under the heading: ‘behaviour in the face of the 
enemy’ the simple word ‘good’ (‘brav’) – Koller took part in the campaigns of 
1813 and 1814 (he belonged to the light cavalry – ‘Dragoner’) All three were 
long-serving soldiers; Radanovich the longest-serving with more than 33 years. 
The category ‘behaviour’ was split into three further subentries: ‘Towards 
civilians’ (‘mit dem Civile’), ‘in the regiment’ (‘im Regiment’) and ‘towards 
his subordinates’ (‘mit seinen Untergebenen’). Radanovich was given the fol-
lowing characterizations: ‘decent’ (in interactions with civilians), ‘pleasing, 
popular and estimated’ (towards his peers in the regiment), ‘knows how to 
maintain respect’, and his behaviour towards his subordinates was described as: 
‘with dignity and authority, severe but fair, cares for his men’. Koller, who was 
much younger, got less telling evaluations: ‘decent’, ‘sociable’ and ‘fair’ (to-
wards his subordinates), and similar judgement were made for Count Deym 
(‘very decent’, ‘generally popular’ and ‘adequate’). 
The evaluation reports comprehended, thus, information about practically all 
relevant social relations of an officer: those within the army and those outside 
towards superiors, equals and subordinates: and, most important of all, in face 
of the enemy. 
4.2 Problem of Social Desirability 
But there is one major – even decisive – problem: we lack standards of com-
parison, and without additional information, we learn more about the conven-
tional norms of behaviour than about the officers themselves. This holds also 
true if we look at the explicitly moral categories of ‘faults’ in their behaviour: 
‘addicted to drink’, ‘gambler’, ‘always in debt’ (‘Schuldenmacher’), ‘brawler’ 
(‘Zänker’). Here, all three received the entry ‘no’; it might well be that their 
superiors shied away from a judgement that could severely dampen the offi-
cer’s hopes for climbing up the career-ladder. 
The old captain Radanovich was apparently already very ill, but was judged 
as ‘very diligent and scrupulous, altogether a very estimable and capable offi-
cer’ – as long as he was ‘still healthy’. Furthermore, the ‘temper’ of Habsburg 
officers was characterized: Radanovich was ‘modest and ambitious’, a Croat 
who spoke German and Croatian fluently and some Italian; Koller was ‘good 
and collected’, Deym ‘cheerful, soft, tractable’. He was also classified (‘in 
overall service’ – ‘sonst im Dienst’) as ‘untiringly passionate’ and ‘striving to 
be useful in manifold ways’. 
All three were good riders, but, nevertheless, not experts with horses (‘Pfer-
dekenner’). We also find in Deym’s form the category ‘power of judgement in 
military matters and talent for higher military education’; he ‘has the gift of 
quick comprehension, in general and a sound judgement; seems to be fit for 
higher education’. 
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The kind of judgement that was presented here is, therefore, rather sche-
matic on the one hand, though more individual on the other. Courage is highly 
praised – not very surprisingly. The quality of leadership refers rather to the 
conditions in the barracks. Technical skills and qualifications were mentioned; 
these were split into ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ knowledge; the ability to train 
and drill ordinary soldiers was listed as well as, for some, the general degree of 
education (‘a man of wide reading’, or ‘writes in a fluent style’). 
4.3 Need for Additional Contexual Information 
Without additional, contextual information, we would not know how to classify 
these sources. Ferdinand von Saar gives us interesting literary evidence about 
how these files were put together. His short narration ‘Lieutenant Burda’ (Saar 
1887/1996), dealing with fictitious events that took place in the early 1850s, 
provides us with fascinating insights into the meaning, content and origin of 
such evaluation records. Burda, an excellent and respected young officer, has 
only one major weakness: His ambitions aim at getting accepted by the nobil-
ity. (Being of bourgeois background, he dreams of high-born ladies and he 
mistakes their reluctant reaction as secret consent.) He tries to prove – against 
all common sense – his aristocratic origins himself. His signature ‘Gf. Burda’ 
can be misread as ‘Count Burda’; his superior, a colonel with benign but also 
inquiring habits, stumbles over this signature just as he is filling out Burda’s 
evaluation report. The colonel’s rather sharp reprimand embarrasses Burda 
deeply in front of his colleagues, who had admired him before. 
4.4 The Meaning of Rank and Respect 
The meaning of rank and respect becomes more than apparent in this little 
scene – which is the first in a series that leads to Burda’s fall from respect to 
ridicule and finally to his death in a duel. 
For the higher-ranking officers, ‘individual descriptions’ were collected that 
offered far more space for elaborate characterization of the achievements and 
qualities of commanders. Maximilian Count Auersperg (General-Field-
Marshall-Lieutenant; holder of the distinction of the ‘Maria-Theresien-Orden’) 
was described – in the category ‘behaviour in the face of the enemy’ – as 
‘known as a courageous soldier, who had distinguished himself in face of the 
enemy in all his positions, without being seriously wounded.’ In the year 1835, 
he had been in service for 48 years and the campaigns he had taken part in 
embraced the period from 1789 until 1815. Major Georg Budich, scarcely 30 
years later (1863), showed in his behaviour ‘resolution, and the urgent wish to 
excel’. His ‘services and merits’ in the field are characterized in detail: he 
served in 1848 during the Italian campaign, also in 1849 and 1859, and all 
minor and major battles are listed chronologically. Lieutenant Colonel Ernst 
Machek’s behaviour in the face of the enemy (in the year 1867, one year after 
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Königgrätz) is described as: ‘shows courage and cold blood’, ‘has proved his 
worth in the campaign of 1859 and he was intrepid and active in all enemy 
contact’; and he was also a good and useful officer in the campaign of 1866 
(both the battles of Solferino and Königgrätz brought a slaughter of a formerly 
unknown scale). 
4.5 Assessing the Source Validity 
In the column ‘behaviour towards subordinates’, Count Auersperg is character-
ized with the words: ‘With seriousness and detailed knowledge of what can be 
demanded of subordinates, didactic, excellent for an officer of the cavalry, just, 
fair, punctilious and sympathetic’. In the case of Budich, we find a heading: 
‘Skills – treatment of officers and men, in order to raise the spirit’ and written 
underneath: ‘Treats officers and men with much tact and quite appropriately, 
knows how to stimulate their spirit and disposes of good knowledge of human 
nature’. Referring to his ‘properties of temper, feeling and character qualities of 
mind’, Machek is said to possess a ‘rather earnest, strong disposition, quiet 
composure without being phlegmatic, has complete control of himself, a firm 
judicial, determined and solid character, energetic, steadfast and resolute; of 
extra-ordinary talent and abundant knowledge, of which he never boasts, a 
particularly explicit organizational talent, quick and autonomous perception’. 
What kind of information do we gain from these evaluation-files? Do they 
enable us to get a picture of the ‘habitus’ and ‘emotions’ of Habsburg officers? 
Their quality as sources will now be judged by adopting the five criteria men-
tioned above: pragmatic intention, emic vs. etic perspective, triangulation and 
the potential for theoretical generalization. 
4.6 Criterion 1: Pragmatic Intention 
Generally speaking, these files were of pragmatic and instrumental importance 
and tell us more about the qualities the army wanted the officers to dispose of. 
In emotional terms: In battle, they should show ‘cold blood’, the famous ‘coup 
d’oeil’, courage in battle, while in the barracks, they should be able to control 
their temper, to be modest, just and firm, and to develop a caring attitude to-
wards subordinates. This would add up to a ‘habitus’ of benign authority in 
peace and manly courage in war. 
4.7 Criterion 2: Emic Perspective 
The categories develop from the ‘emic’ perspective of the actors involved and 
mirror every-day convictions about the necessary skills and virtues and their 
ascription on the basis of every-day beliefs. The reasons why this data does not 
mirror some simple reality are manifold: 
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On the one hand, they represent the official face of a ‘people-processing in-
stitution’ which generates data very selectively and according to multiple filters 
that distort the ‘objective’ picture of the authentic, individual event or person in 
action: Everyone who has ever read a detailed report about the tumultuous 
event of a battle knows how often courage is not rewarded by a distinction or 
cowardice not punished due to indulgence or selective interests. The same goes 
for the behaviour in barracks – ethnomethodological studies, like that of  
Cicourcel (1968) about ‘The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice’, have 
documented the statistical consequences of labelling beyond doubt. 
On the other hand, the categories and the entries are largely still very ab-
stract and do not really tell us much about the reality both of norms (referring 
to courage or resolution) and qualities of behaviour (for example, referring to 
the extent of professional skills in tactical or organizational matters). Being 
aware of the potential limitations contained in every-day beliefs and stereo-
types, we must strive to gain more systematic knowledge of the range of mean-
ing attributed by soldiers and officers to ‘authority’, ‘obedience’, ‘severe’ and 
‘fair’, ‘punctilious’ and ‘popular’. 
4.8 Criterion 3: Etic Perspective 
According to our third criterion, the ‘etic’ perspective has to be introduced in 
order to complement the limited view of those involved in the categorization-
process. Seen from this angle, we would need institutional and processual 
information about structures and their changes in the Habsburg army, corre-
lated with a quantifying analysis of sufficiently large samples of data that in-
form reliably about changes in the definitions (mirroring changing norms; the 
famous ‘coup d’oeil’ is an invention following French models). We could also 
try to compare officers and their attributes without and with battle-experience 
and look also at their national background. But from there to the documentation 
of a habitus it will still be a long way to go. 
4.9 Criterion 4: Triangulation 
In order to be able to guess the meaning of some of the terms that define our 
notion of ‘military habitus’, we might be inclined to use complementary 
sources of another kind. We get a different impression of the norms regarding 
‘courage’ if we attentively study some fictional sources – when Torresani 
(1900) tells the story of four Habsburg officers, caught in the Hungarian upris-
ing, fighting with their fear of death: Three are shot, one goes free, and the 
norm that every Habsburg officer has to sacrifice his life without hesitation 
meets with the reality of terrible fright. 
Another example is the narration of Himmel von Agisburg (1900) who tells 
about the nearly suicidal attempt of Austrian soldiers to save their regimental 
flag under massive, deadly breech-loader fire. Of course, fictional sources 
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normally hide shamefully the ineptitude and lack of tactical knowledge that 
other sources – autobiographies – bring to daylight (for instance, that of Still-
fried von Rathenitz, in the context of the Bosnian campaign 1878 and later). 
Here, we even get the impression of a rising number of officers with a non-
aristocratic, ‘bildungsbürgerlichen’ origin who have not been made familiar 
with tactical training in the field and who were tormented by an all-pervasive, 
sterile, rigorous discipline of the barracks. Even we admit that these other 
sources create problems of their own because of their embeddedness in other 
pragmatic contexts, we would not want to abandon this option light-heartedly 
since it promises to enrich our understanding of the whole culture that shapes 
norms and behaviour in the field we intend to study. 
4.10 Criterion 5: Conceptual Generalization 
What we don’t get here is the kind of information which would allow us to 
determine somewhat like the ‘true extent’ of these emotions and habitualized 
character-traits in Habsburg officers and to compare them with those of officers 
of other armies or to delineate trends. 
Acknowledging this, we turn now to those sources who promise more prox-
imity to reality: autobiographies and diaries – the so-called ego-documents. 
5. Data Type 2: Ego-Documents 
5.1 Description of the Data Source 
Between 1792 and 1815, the Habsburg Monarchy had to face a severe existen-
tial crisis. The highly motivated and flexible French, leaving behind any notion 
of impassable terrain and regarding every place as fit to wage a battle, posed 
nearly insurmountable problems for the traditionally clumsy Habsburg war-
machine. The heavy defeats Austrian commanders suffered from hands of the 
French and their invincible genius Napoleon came as a unique shock. Invalu-
able evidence for this can be found in a booklet authored by the Austrian gen-
eral and commander (‘Feldzeugmeister’ = general-quartermaster) Leiberich 
von Mack, who surrendered disgracefully at Ulm in 1805 with a large army 
(resp. their remaining 30.000 men) to the troops of Napoleon. As a conse-
quence, Mack was court-martialled; he tried to save his honour by addressing 
the public.3 
                                                             
3  The title of his elaborate and comprehensive written defence against the charge of treason 
hanging over him was: ‘Vertheidigung des österreichischen Feldzugs von 1805. Dem 
Hofkriegsrath übergeben von dem General-Feld-Zeugmeister von Mack, Wien (bei Joseph 
Schmidt) 1806’ (‘Defence of the Austrian Campaign of 1805. Submitted to the Court War 
Council by General-Quartermaster von Mack’). 
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In this ego-document, Mack gives a vivid account of his emotional state and 
of his failure to act in face of the threatening might of the French army that had 
been built up with terrible speed. He explains his own situation in unsparing 
detail, but he also turns to the whole structure and history of an unhappy logic 
of events that had put him into a position he could neither master nor reject. At 
the same time, he expresses enthusiastic estimation of Napoleon’s gift as a 
commander to whom he felt hopelessly inferior. Mack sees his main weakness 
in his ‘faltering and hesitation’. Surprised by the enormous speed of the French 
operations, his army (one of three Austrian armies that would have combined 
and joined forces with the Russians) gets encircled, and his ‘ill genius’ offers 
no good advice: 
The unexpected direction of the enemy’s marches had confused me com-
pletely. I consulted, asked higher authorities, deliberated, and, thus, lost time 
that would have been better used for acting; until I finally decided to send 
15.000 men from the army at Ulm in order to reinforce the troops in Tyrol 
and, with joint forces, to pave the way for Archduke Charles who, with 25.000 
men, came from Italy to aid the great army; these 15000 men ran into the ar-
my of Marshall Soult at Memmingen and were decimated (Mack 1806: 248-9; 
translation by author.). 
Mack’s defense is an interesting, even impressive document in more than 
one respect. It is the unsparing self-criticism of a sensitive and intelligent man 
who knows that his reputation is ruined forever and that he has to face this fact 
like a force of nature. It is also a very perceptive analysis of the real events 
taking place in a battle against opinion from outside; it demonstrates awareness 
of the meaning of chance, luck or the auto-dynamics of emotion. 
He who always is victorious is finally used to being victorious; he who is al-
ways vanquished no longer thinks of victory, and will become, with every bat-
tle fought, more and more discouraged, and, thus, more miserable (Mack 
1806: 267). 
He describes himself as someone 
who, to some extent, dared unthinkingly, and, as a consequence, then lost his 
presence of mind, and ran blindly into misfortune, lacking wisdom and en-
ergy, on the waves of fate, sacrificing his glory, his luck, the life of his men, 
and the honour of his monarch, like a careless boy (ibid.: 30). 
Mack knows that his failure also weakened the courage of all his troops 
(ibid: 292); he compares their enfeebled spirit with the exemplary, war-like 
spirit in the French army (ibid.: 303); with its professional composure and 
unshakable confidence, it forms a marked contrast to the Austrian army which 
was, originally, even superior in numbers. 
But Mack does not only describe his own psychological state in unmistak-
able terms; he is also an excellent observer of the problems stemming from 
alliances, and here, he denominates the psychological attributes of good com-
manders in general (control of vanity, altruism in terms of the welfare of their 
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troops) and those qualities of character that prevent good cooperation: envy, 
jealousy, national prejudices, egoism and stubbornness. (ibid.: 274-6). 
He also gives far-reaching, partly historical explanations for the lack of 
good commanders in Austria since Prince Eugene. He blames Austrian bu-
reaucracy and analyses skilfully the superior way of warfare that originated in 
France and culminated in Napoleon.  
What now is the value of this source (and comparable sources) as evidence 
for an Austrian habitus? Above all, it cannot stand alone, it has to be comple-
mented by different, equally trustworthy information, both in self-report and in 
observation of persons and matters outside. Let us now subsume the informa-
tion contained in Mack’s self-defence according to the five points we devel-
oped for the sociology-of-knowledge evaluation of process-produced data in 
Chapter 3. 
5.2 Criterion 1: Pragmatic Intention 
Referring to the criterion of pragmatic intention, we can say that Mack’s book-
let was a defence against an all too real accusation; he hoped to save his honour 
and life against the reproach of treason. The type of speech-act ‘defence’ with 
all its illocutionary and perlocutionary implications differs significantly from 
that of a purely descriptive proposition and frames all of Mack’s utterances 
even if they have the ring of factuality. One may gain the impression that he 
sketches the extent of his emotional and professional incompetence as much 
larger than necessary in order to perhaps evade the even worse accusation of 
treason. 
But the whole scale of his self-accusation (which is not a trivial matter, hap-
less commanders usually blame everyone but themselves) does not hide one 
fact: He lacked decision and will-power in the moment of truth, therefore, the 
battle was lost. But he also names the institutional dilemma: unclear, messy 
structures of command; institutionalized, professional incompetence of many 
of his colleagues – who were, in contrast to 100 years later, largely members of 
the high nobility. 
5.3 Criterion 2: Emic Perspective 
The second point deals with the ‘emic’ character of his self-interpretation and 
the understanding of the authority-structures that had prevented him from inde-
pendent, autonomous decision-making: His self-interpretation is a perfect illus-
tration of what Clausewitz had in mind when he described the lack of war-like 
spirit of the troops or the absent genius of their commander. Mack uses the 
same predicates – inactivity, loss of the presence of mind, lacking energy, 
lacking courage; and he gives a good example of what Clausewitz meant by 
‘moral courage’. Here and in the observation of his fellow-officers, his every-
day-knowledge is more than sufficient and made explicit. 
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Of course, he cannot speak about those psychological mechanisms and outer 
circumstances he does not know although they might have influenced him. He 
probably does not see himself as being an example of a typical psychic (and 
social) habitus. But the text does give information where other similar narra-
tions often do not: The last supreme commander of the Habsburg army 1918, 
Arz von Straußenburg, also wrote his memoirs from the Great War (Arz 1924), 
without ever giving hints about the state of his mind or soul; here, we can only 
guess the reality behind his depiction by drawing analogies from the descrip-
tion of visible behaviour. 
5.4 Criterion 3: Etic Perspective 
The third criterion is that of the suitability of the data in the source under ques-
tion for the purposes of theoretical interpretation from an ‘etic’ perspective, 
which is also – as a rule – linked to the classification as ‘typical’ for the Aus-
trian habitus. 
Although Mack is no bad theoretician on its own, it is only the theoretical 
interpretation, based on knowledge about structures and processes taking place 
in Austrian armies during, but also before the French Wars, which enables the 
typification of a ‘Habsburg Military Habitus’. We find, thus, already in the 
Wars of Austrian succession (1740-1763) quite similar, dramatic examples of 
lack of decision, faltering and dithering (singling out one figure – in Charles of 
Lorraine, who lost four battles against Prussia´s Frederick in a quite similar 
way; cf. the literature on the ‘Österreichischer Erbfolgekrieg’ in 6 vols.; and 
Allmayer-Beck 1981). We find the same consideration for the authority of the 
Court in Vienna, and the slow, defensive ‘Austrian philosophy of battle’ has 
been carefully described by Allmayer-Beck 1981. Radetzky (cf. Regele 1957) 
remarked once, that the Emperor´s four military advisers would form a body 
that prevented indeed every successful conduct of war. And at an even higher 
level, we can see the structural reasons for all of this lying in the patrimonial 
bureaucracy of the Habsburg Empire, with its semi-feudal and centrifugal 
tendencies, that were the declared enemy of all central coordination and ener-
getic will-power. 
Thus, Mack’s narrative fits in easily with these theoretically grounded sus-
picions. It serves more as additional evidence; it does not contain much that we 
would regard as anomaly when perceived from our own knowledge-back-
ground. 
5.5 Criterion 4: Triangulation 
The ‘Generalstabswerk’ about the war in 1809 went beyond scrupulously list-
ing all reforms initiated by Archduke Charles, reforms that were prompted by 
the defeats suffered at the hands of the French. These reforms included creating 
of smaller, more autonomous ‘army corps’ instead of the big, old linear armies, 
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advocating better cooperation and self-reliant action, departing from the old 
logistics of securing transport-links by keeping well-staffed fortifications, 
shifting from defence to attack, training of a new type of rifleman – the self-
reliant ‘tirailleur’, departing from machine-like drills and shifting towards 
autonomous judgement. Moreover, it gives ample evidence for the persistence 
of a habitus hostile to change. We find here ample confirmation for the impres-
sion Mack gave of the slow speed of Austrian armies, of the hierarchical con-
straints that prevented quick and bold reaction and we might even reach the 
conclusion that Mack’s behaviour was perhaps wrong, but certainly not his 
own fault alone. 
5.6 Criterion 5: Conceptual Generalization 
We come, thus, to the point of the comparability of Mack’s sketch of an Aus-
trian habitus with that of foreign armies. In his defence, he deals less with most 
of the other European armies as rivals or allies of the Habsburg army with the 
only exception of the French. 
Here, unfavourable (self-)characterizations abound. He gives many hints 
about what made Napoleon superior; but we get no reliable information about 
how the Austrians would fare in comparison to the other great powers. Lack of 
determination and coordination, lack of clarity and autonomy of command are 
distinct predicates that mark the central difference to Napoleon. The latter had 
also ruined the reputation of many other armies, among them the honour of the 
formerly invincible Prussians. But while the Prussians went through a period of 
painstaking reforms both of the army and society, starting in the year 1807, that 
changed their character by giving more weight to the commitment and enthusi-
asm of the nation, Austria stayed caught in the old forces of patrimonialism and 
particularism. The pattern Mack describes is detailed enough to be found as a 
very general and typical one – of course, always seen against the background of 
other reliable sources. 
6. Data Type 3: Autobiographies as Semi-Official 
Documents 
6.1 Description of the Data Source 
The First World War has become the ultimate touchstone for the old Habsburg 
Army. In a quite specific sense, it did not pass the test – as we know, the war 
was lost, the Monarchy crumbled and with it a European centre of power that 
had helped to shape Europe for more than 400 years. Was a specifically Habs-
burg Austrian mentality also responsible for this? Can we identify the traits of 
hesitation, of half-heartedness and passivity also in the four years between 
1914 and 1918? 
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The example illustrated here consists of a private, unpublished autobiogra-
phy of a high-ranking Habsburg officer: the memoirs of the major-general Paul 
Schinnerer (1869-1957) which begin with memories from early childhood and 
end with the aftermath of the armistice in 1918. They were apparently based on 
diaries (otherwise, the sometimes day-to-day reconstruction of events would be 
wholly implausible) and provide information about Schinnerer’s education, 
military training, his experiences at the Russian front as, first as an officer of 
the general staff and then, as field-officer; until his career had led him to the 
post of a commanding major general at the Isonzo-front against Italy. These 
memoirs amount to roughly 560 pages of typescript (from the original hand-
writing) and had been collected and archived for scientific purposes (Institut 
für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte in Vienna, among roughly 50 other ac-
counts). 
Schinnerer was born in Vienna in 1869 as a son of a textile merchant and 
thus belonged to the mercantile middle-class and not to the aristocracy – nei-
ther to the ‘Amtsadel’ of recently ennobled members of military and bureauc-
racy nor the ‘real’ nobility of old. His memoirs give ample evidence of his 
distance to the old warrior-caste and warrior-code typical for the Habsburg and 
Russian armies of the 18th and much of the 19th centuries, bearing witness 
instead to a peaceful-commercial, unmilitary attitude of the Viennese bourgeoi-
sie with pacifist and German-nationalist undertones. 
The development of his character, the psychic process that also included 
strong emotions of shame and inferiority, provides us with a kind of informa-
tion to decide on the existence of a ‘psychic’ and ‘social’ habitus with much 
more justification than is provided in other sources (including Mack’s account 
discussed above). But, in contrast to the feudal spirit that still prevailed in the 
writings from Saar, he never turned to duels to restore his endangered reputa-
tion: the military branch he was involved in was logistics, transport, supple-
mentation and staff-like military planning. He owed his advancement into 
higher officer-ranks to his ‘technical skills’, not to his brilliant appearance at 
court or salons. His qualification was proved in examinations; and this also 
shaped his world-view in military matters. Long before the war, he complained 
again and again about the spirit of feudal tradition and the hostility against 
modernization that he felt dominated the whole Habsburg army. Schinnerer 
addressed the problem of a social habitus hostile to innovation quite directly: 
Also quite different men would have been necessary, for all resembled each 
other. It was not possible to do any more with these same people one had to 
work with; the old ideas and the old humdrum way could not be stamped out 
anymore. If one was removed, another one reclaimed his position and went on 
in the old way; one was able to change the people, but the way of thinking was 
the same. Even Conrad (the most important, charismatic Austrian commander; 
H.K.) was not better. He, too, was a ‘Wiener Neustädter’ (trained in the fa-
mous Military Academy, founded by Maria-Theresa, H.K.), and he never ma-
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naged to distance himself from the education of his young age there (Schin-
nerer I, 172; translation by author, here and in the following quotations). 
Schinnerer addresses the classical properties of the concept of ‘habitus’ 
which includes ideas, but also habits that guide actions unconsciously; it is 
coined in young age, but persists – as a disposition – through a whole life-time. 
Part of this habitus is an attitude of ‘lacking foresight’ and of ‘chimeras of 
those on the top’ (‘Phantastereien der Höheren’, I, p.185), which no one dares 
to oppose. Again and again, Schinnerer characterizes superiors who shun real 
work and who denounce all critics as ‘pessimists’. His hard judgement hits all 
professional ‘optimists’ who underrate the enemy: 
I saw that we would enter the decisive struggle wholly unprepared, saw the 
frightening backwardness awaiting in all areas and the complete headlessness 
and the criminal thoughtlessness of our leading circles in military and police 
(Schinnerer I, 194). 
He demonstrates the Austrian lack of preparation for a war he had always 
been convinced to be unavoidable, by indicating dozens of examples – from 
wrong equipment to unrealistic exercises, from lacking fortifications to lack of 
tactical training, etc. 
Schinnerer’s observations are penetrating and of great interest to our re-
search question. He complements the analysis of a ‘habitus in battle’ by turn-
ing his eye on the ‘habitus in peace’ (thus broadening the concept in a way that 
was also advocated by Clausewitz – although the latter could not have known 
how technological warfare would develop nearly a century after his writings). 
He also seems to contradict our assumption that it was only a ‘habitus of de-
fence’ and ‘hesitation’ which could be held responsible for a lack of decision 
and resolution. While advocating ‘pessimism’ as a tool for further, rational 
action, he dismisses ‘optimism’ as unfounded and, thus, detrimental to the war 
effort. I confess not being sure myself if I have to take Schinnerer’s ‘pessi-
mism’ as further evidence for the Austrian spirit of passivity, leading to defeat, 
or if I should treat it rather as ‘realism’, against which the ‘optimism’ of the 
frivolous waste of leading generals and commanders has to be seen as a motor 
of later defeat. Clausewitz thought this possible and we find several instances 
of unfounded optimism to be soon followed by catastrophic apathy and then 
defeat (see also the fate of Charles of Lorraine). But we can take for certain that 
Schinnerer’s attitude differed enormously from the more feudal spirit of many 
Austrian commanders, in particular of the cavalry, who found themselves soon 
disillusioned after their catastrophic defeats in Galicia 1914. The difference is 
also one of social background: bourgeoisie vs. aristocracy. 
When the war arrives, it finds Schinnerer as a member of the general staff in 
Galicia. The coming disaster of the 3rd army which had to retreat soon after the 
collapse of the illusionary attempt of attacking a hugely superior enemy (1.2 
million Austrians fighting against 1.8 million better equipped Russians) is 
nothing unexpected to Schinnerer. The responsible generals are criticized be-
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cause of their carelessness, tactical deficits, inertia and self-deception. Being 
convinced that the main thrust of the Russian army would hit the Austrians 
near Lemberg, he is frightened by the prospect of the offensively advancing 
Austrian troops, unprotected in their flank, being pushed to attack a superior 
enemy. Soon, terrible chaos will rule; no one finds anyone; the locations of 
higher command can no longer be identified; some commanders shoot them-
selves, many ‘show their full incompetence’ (II, p.12) or surrender inglori-
ously, such as Field Marshall Lieutenant Krauss-Ellislago, ‘the greatest swin-
dler and fraud’ (II, p.13). 
The most detailed description of the emotions that accompanied this catas-
trophe can be found in another autobiography, that of Constantin Schneider 
(2003) who was a young 1st lieutenant at that time: 
Here they came, forming a sad line on the road. Dusty horses with their heads 
hanging down, some riders, dusty, unrecognizable, I identified them only at 
close range: They were my friends from the regiment, most of them with ble-
mished faces, black from dust and dirt, with wide open, protruding eyes and a 
mad look. (…) Heaps of men stuck to the limbers, like refugees, sitting sunk 
down and staring with the miserable look of hopelessness (Schneider 2003: 
87; translation by author). 
In this quotation, we find the emotions described vividly in the language of 
observation; the sentiment of hopelessness is given unmistakable expression 
and so is the lack of trust in the wisdom of the men’s commanders. Schneider 
confirms the impression of lack of leadership and over-ambitious orders that 
can not be followed any longer. Many officers simply disappear and let their 
men down. 
The various, mixed emotions combine to create the picture of an Austrian 
habitus in which soldiers are often led by officers and commanders who either 
form an inhuman caste of butchers totally ignoring the value and dignity of the 
lives that have been committed to them, or who were small tyrants, rulers over 
life and death, at safe distance from the bloody events themselves (see Schnei-
der 2003: 351). 
It is in Schneider’s account that we can also find the important comparative 
perspective, missing in many other sources, which allows us to determine the 
relative weight of an Austrian military habitus, here, compared with that of the 
Germans: 
How different was the new spirit that the German command taught us: Sim-
plicity was their device and how to spare human material. We had been told of 
glorious episodes of struggle when a company undertook an assault and only 
ten men stayed alive. How our commanders admired the leader of such a 
company as hero and decorated him with medals. It was different with the 
Germans: they rewarded, above all, the commander who achieved the greatest 
success with the least losses. We lacked this kind of understanding totally. 
The whole conduct of war aimed at blind bravery which arose rather from 
desperation than from enthusiasm. To have raised this risky bravery was the 
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guilt of our commanders, their activity was often that of butchers, their mean-
ing was cruelty and their reward was perdition (Schneider 2003: 351). 
What, now, is the value of autobiographies like the ones discussed here, ac-
cording to the criteria formulated in Chapter 3? 
6.2 Criterion 1: Pragmatic Intention 
Schinnerer’s and Schneider’s autobiographic accounts have to be evaluated 
carefully with respect of the intention and imagined audience at the time of 
their origination. Furthermore, we need plausible evidence of their authenticity 
as correct remembrance by simply asking: When were the facts remembered? 
At the time they occurred? Or afterwards, written from hindsight, which might 
also distort the memory towards the feared or wanted outcome? 
In the case of Schinnerer, we do not know exactly; the narrative was cer-
tainly helped by diaries, but since there is no proof of these, we cannot compare 
and are, therefore, not completely sure what was authentic in the emotions at 
the time and what was added later. 
Furthermore, we have to ask ourselves about the general frame of intention 
of this act of communication. It might have had the function of seeing accom-
modation with the tragic present situation of total defeat which seemed to make 
the effort of a whole life appear meaningless and an unequalled waste. But the 
wish to communicate his experiences to his children (he had several, born 
already before the war) can also be powerful. As long as we imagine our chil-
dren reading about the deeds of our past, we will probably not be unsparingly 
honest in all respects. 
But even more important for our correct interpretation is the whole frame of 
accusation – largely devoid of self-defence – that shapes Schinnerer’s memoirs. 
This point of view mirrors the changed composition of the Habsburg officer-
staff: Already in the year 1896, 78% of all officers had a non-aristocratic back-
ground (Kandelsdorfer, quoted by Deák 1991: 193-4), and in particular, the 
technical troops (including artillery) were predominantly bourgeois. 
And so, all in all (it could not be documented here), we find a code of con-
duct in Schinnerer’s text which favours reason, humanism while opposing 
unnecessary cruelty and useless, heroic death. His values are those of a dili-
gent, hard-working, educated bourgeoisie and, thus, opposed to aristocratic 
‘noblesse oblige’, carelessness and acceptance of death as fate. 
The contrast to the memoirs of the aristocratic commander Arz could not be 
greater: The same unhappy constellation that prompted Schinnerer to his narra-
tive of reflexive, dark-pessimistic characterisation leads to a quite different 
conclusion in Arz: 
The 3rd army had fought east of Lemberg less happily than the 4th army. It 
had to retreat in face of the superior pressure of the Russians back to the We-
reszyca, where the 2nd army, who had partly just arrived coming from Serbia, 
closed rank with its southern wing. Here, the battle was to be taken up again 
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with all available forces, for which purpose the bold decision was taken to 
make the 4th army turn around and make it intervene through Rawaruska. To 
realise this intention of throwing around a whole army with its whole baggage 
train demanded the sharp eye of a leader and a firm hand. The victor of Koma-
rov possessed both (Arz 1924: 23; translation by author). 
This short paragraph is symptomatic for the whole text. Even in defeat, the 
language is active, forceful, and the picture of an Austrian habitus is not visi-
ble. Since he was the last Austrian commander of all troops, he probably felt 
responsible for the army and its state; therefore, if he blames someone, then it 
is bad fate, the enemy or whatever, rather than one of his ‘own’ officers. 
Yet a different narrative context can be found in the in the case of ‘semi’- 
official regimental history. 1st Lieutenant Burger wrote, on basis of his diary, a 
comprehensive account of the fate of his regiment (‘Tiroler Landesschützen’ = 
Tyrolian infantry) in Galicia and against Italy which was published posthu-
mously (and passing censorship) in 1917, in the midst of the war still going on. 
His report is rich in statements about his and his comrades’ emotions, compara-
tively honest, but he does not doubt the ultimate wisdom of Austrian army 
command. While telling a heroic story, it was meant both to move, and to 
stimulate the general spirit and confidence in the Austrian army. We learn of 
the organizational chaos that soon broke out at the Russian front, hear of great 
losses (Berger 1917, pp.29), but the overall spirit is optimistic: 
At a higher level, one will have probably recognized the strength of the enemy 
and assessed it correctly already in these days. But the troops themselves un-
derestimated the Russian enemy completely. We paid for this quite massively 
(Burger 1917: 29; translation by author). 
It is confidence that has not been shattered. Similarly the story was told in a 
regimental history of the so-called ‘Dreierschützen’ (Styrian riflemen): 
Every attack was repulsed with the cold blood and tenacity of the Styrian. The 
Russians tried to break through with overwhelming force and cunning, their 
guns fired furiously on the small heap of warriors around the farm yard. But 
although the defenders lacked any support of the artillery and although the 
machine guns were much disturbed by enemy fire and could not come to as-
sistance, the brave men did not cede. They shot so quietly and sure of their 
aim that the Russians, after several vain attacks, had to fall back again to a 
respectful distance (Strohschneider 1931: 48-9; my translation, H. K.). 
Although also these sources tell of terrible sacrifices, non-existing commu-
nication, apparent failures of coordination and lack of leadership, their lan-
guage is rather that of heroic resistance and its legitimation. In order to decide 
on the existence of (and explanation of behaviour by) an Austrian habitus, we 
have to compare analogous events, processes, behaviour and indicators of 
emotion in a quite detailed way. 
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6.3 Criterion 2: Emic Perspective 
The second dimension we had introduced earlier for the evaluation of a source 
was the plausibility and range of the ‘emic’ perspective of the narrator. It dif-
fers very much according to the degree of reflexivity that the autobiographer 
achieves (with reference to the ‘inner’, ‘emotional’ processes he/she becomes 
aware of; and to the range of possible observation that the author can dispose 
of. In the case of Schinnerer, we can trust his knowledge of the behaviour and 
the personality of his fellow-officers, but we don’t know about his ability to 
empathize with the ordinary soldier. This position enables him to see some 
things more sharply and some less exactly than the officers who were closest to 
the front-line. 
6.4 Criterion 3: Etic Perspective 
The third dimension of embedding in an ‘etic’ perspective from outside that 
implicates ‘theorizing’ has also to be considered here. With hindsight and 
equipped with masses of literature on the events at the Russian front (see, for 
instance, Rauchensteiner’s (1994) magnificent account), we sometimes know 
more than the author. While Schinnerer is also blinded by the passions and 
prejudices of his class and position and, moreover, by his and Austria’s fate in 
the war, and since he is simply not able to locate the causes of some major 
military and peacetime decisions that take shape behind the doors and far from 
the sphere of his influence and knowledge, we can now, from hindsight and 
equipped with well-confirmed narratives about events and institutions of the 
late Habsburg Empire, gain structural explanations for the weakness of the 
Habsburg army and we can locate Schinnerer’s or Schneider’s character as a 
historically new type: the bourgeois, technically educated and trained soldier 
replacing the feudal, careless aristocratic warrior of old. He does not share their 
equanimity in the face of death, but compares what he sees with what he thinks 
would be better and reasonable. A theory of the Habsburg military habitus 
should embrace this aspect of transition as well.  
6.5 Criterion 4: Triangulation 
In order to typify and categorize the range of an Austrian habitus, we also 
have to be open to the anomalous, irregular observation that does not fit in with 
our theoretical knowledge. In Schinnerer’s autobiography, I found two obser-
vations striking: 
1) that of the importance of the professional seriousness as part of a military 
habitus that is already formed in peacetime; 
2) that of the counterproductive, counterintuitive character of ‘optimism’. 
‘Pessimism’ may not always be a precondition of defeat, but also an appeal 
to realism. Therefore, the concept of ‘hesitation and faltering’ as typical of 
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an Austrian habitus has to be complemented by the notion of an unthinking 
optimism. 
This kind of revision may be a not insignificant reward of meticulously sti-
fling through empirical material. 
6.6 Criterion 5: Conceptual Generalization 
Finally, we would like to draw comparative conclusions on the basis of this 
source. Unfortunately, Schinnerer’s account follows a normatively-rationalist 
model of the conduct of war without laying much attention on comparisons 
with existing types in other armies. Only some dispersed remarks focus on the 
‘superior’ ways of Germans, sometimes also of Russians or Italians, although 
these latter armies are everything but the epitome of efficiency. But there are 
other autobiographies, like that of Constantin Schneider, who do compare, and 
who can also be trusted for their expertise. 
7. Methodological Conclusions 
Referring to the research question central to this paper – can we find something 
like an Austrian military habitus that made failure in war more likely? –, the 
three types of data provided us with various strengths and weaknesses if 
checked against Laslett’s quantification-oriented ideal and if evaluated accord-
ing to the softer criterion of ‘trustworthiness’. 
Public administrational data, like the evaluation-files for officers and com-
manders, have two advantages and three weaknesses: Since they are the prod-
uct of bureaucratic action and reasoning, they are official, relatively stable 
operational definitions of the desired character-qualities of soldiers in com-
mand, with a certain degree of abstraction that resembles sociological categori-
zation. One can imagine interpreting such data in longitudinal analyses which 
may lead to the detection of developmental patterns both of norms guiding the 
behaviour of Austrian officers and eventually also of their behaviour itself – the 
latter, if we can give rough estimates of the various filters that define bureau-
cratic assessment of these qualities. These filter-processes have the advantage 
of providing reproducible classifications, yet they also create problems for the 
interpretation. Their abstractness prevents us from finding the character-traits 
in question in the experience and emotions of the acting persons themselves. 
Standards of comparison with respect to the behaviour and habitus of other 
armies are also lacking. 
In the case of autobiographies and other ego-documents, this paper has tried 
to show that the one major problem described by Laslett – that interests and 
strategies or unconscious mentalities and expectations of the writers can influ-
ence the quality and substance of the data – can be sufficiently dealt with so as 
to secure the kind of objectivity that is also indispensable in order to do justice 
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to the softer criterion of ‘trustworthiness’. This can be achieved by comparing 
narratives of persons with diverse, even conflicting background and interests, 
as in the case of the self-defence of Mack and the uncompromising warrior-
attitude of Arz, or in the comparison of loyal regimental histories with voices 
of convinced critics like Schinnerer or Schneider. 
But Laslett’s postulate that scientific data should contain at least a rough es-
timate of quantitative proportions can scarcely be met except in the plain sense 
that we should aim at a fair selection of articulations from people with recog-
nizably different background, in particular with different social origins (bour-
geois vs. aristocratic or lower-class membership). We cannot hope to map the 
various emotions or character-traits proportionately. 
And yet it would be wrong to assume that this would make the whole enter-
prise worthless. Autobiographies, diaries or even letters may be able to portray 
a whole social environment and describe observable facts mixed with state-
ments of observed expressions of emotions of human beings. They can be seen 
as ‘native speakers’ of their section of the world and the quality of their contri-
bution can be matched with the information contained in various other sources 
– battle reports, description of landscapes in more peaceful times, and so on. If 
these sources get one detail wrong, then this might be an error that does not 
necessarily destroy all other truth contained in other information. 
On the other hand, their plausibility is enhanced if this data can be verified. 
One criterion is the degree of accordance of various voices with each other; 
Schneider and Schinnerer converge visibly. 
Another is that of theoretical embeddedness – the mechanisms that produce 
Austrian structures of authority can be delineated through centuries. The most 
consequential of all distinctions made in this paper is, thus, that of the ‘emic’ 
vs. the ‘etic’ character of the narratives under scrutiny. The writers of autobiog-
raphies are also theorists of their own emotions and of those of others. 
The quality of their theories and abilities of observation will differ greatly. 
They will often formulate composite characterizations in which they infer 
complex traits of persons or elements of a situation from a combination of 
simple observations; sometimes, they also give examples of simple expressions 
or behaviour. Mack, for instance, summarized very comprehensively; Schin-
nerer was much more detailed and provided character-descriptions that can be 
compared with those given by other commentators (he converges with Schnei-
der on Conrad). Schneider was the most literary of all and had an extremely 
rich vocabulary for describing single emotions. He was also the one who drew 
substantive and informative comparisons with the military habitus of other 
armies. 
But as far-reaching, comprehensive and knowledgeable these autobiogra-
phers were, their narratives also must always be complemented by the ‘etic’ 
perspective of the researcher outside. The separation-line between ‘emic’ and 
‘etic’ will be fluent; the more experienced and informed our commentator is, 
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the less that has to be added from outside. But at last, it is the theoretical model 
of the social macro-process and of the psychic micro-process that frames value 
and meaning of the data. Of course, the theory also has to be open for its even-
tual falsification. 
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